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Abstract 
On the question of whether external finance stimulates GDP growth, the profession offers inconclusive as well as 
frequent contradictory outcomes. While waiting for a robust consensus, this paper addressed directly the 
mechanisms through which external finance should influence economic growth. Investment was identify as the 
most significant transmission mechanism, and as well considers effects via funding regime consumption 
expenditure and import. By employing the residual generated repressors’, we accomplish a measure of the 
overall influence of external finance on economic growth, accounting for the influence through investment. 
Based on the pooled panel outcomes, a sample of twenty-five Sub-Saharan Africa economies were examine over 
the period of 1970-1997; the result indicates that there is a significant and positive effect of overseas assistance 
on economic growth, ceteris paribus. Based on average, each one percent point upsurge in the aid/GNP ratio 
contributes one-quarter of one percent point to the growth rate. Therefore, the poor economic growth in Africa 
should not be attributed to external finance ineffectiveness. 
Keywords: Aid; External finance; Growth; Investment; Sub-Saharan Africa 
JEL classification: F35, O40, O55 
 
1 Introduction  
Sub-Saharan African1 (SSA) is the world leading beneficiary of overseas assistance since the creation of the 
post-war financial system at Bretton Woods (Moyo and Ferguson, 2010). Since 1960, international donors has 
channeled over US$568 billion to the development of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), representing approximately 15 
percent of the region GDP or proportionally four times the Marshall plan that restarted the European economies 
after the Second World War (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2010). While some other record 
states that in aggregate terms over the course of the last 50 years, foreign aid transfers to governments in Sub-
Saharan Africa totaled a staggering $1 trillion.2  With all these amount been poured into Sub-Saharan Africa still 
the economic growth in the region has not followed the trend of official development assistance (ODA) inflows, 
but has remained low in spite of the recovery of economic activity in the early 2000s (2.37 percent on average). 
This incident is partly the reason donor nations argued that foreign aid was not succeeding in accomplishing 
expected objectives (Lancaster, 2007). For example, donor nations were frustrated with the apparent dearth of 
relationship between overseas assistance and the strengthening of economic and social institutions in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Fengler & Kharas, 2010). 
Sub-Saharan Africa economies continue to present vital challenges to international donor community. 
Although overseas assistance to the region dropped in the 1990s, it has not stopped. Certain nations, Sweden and 
certain European countries in particular, have become larger external finance donors in current years (Robinson, 
2011). India and China, contemplating their increasing significance in the World economy, have as well turns 
out to be more prominent donors to Sub-Saharan Africa (Noman, Botchwey and Stein, 2012). As anticipated, 
there is an extensive range of views from numerous experts when it comes to this difficult question: Does 
foreign aid plays any significant role in attaining its two key goals: stimulating economic growth and reducing 
poverty? There have been numerous debates to this effect; experts continue to build the case for, or against, 
overseas assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, with two broad divisions having emerged: experts who debate that 
overseas assistance engenders inefficiencies in the recipient nation and so fails in accomplishing its objective of 
“institution-strengthening” (Van Deer Veen, 2011) and experts who debate that overseas assistance is beneficial.  
This paper contributes to an answer by gauging the effectiveness of overseas assistance to Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries, particularly accounting for the influence on growth through investment. We debate that 
external finance has been growth-fostering but may possibly not have been adequate to overcome the several 
growth-retarding factors encountering by Sub-Saharan Africa economies. This proposes that an upsurge in 
external finance, correctly make use of, could be advantageous to the recipient nations. This paper is different 
from most past literature in two other aspects. In this paper, we restrict our analysis to a sample of Sub-Saharan 
Africa economies only. There is substantial proof in the empirical growth literature that Sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                 
1 Sub-Saharan Africa: The United Nations defines Sub-Saharan Africa as every country in Africa but Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara; that is as every African country that is not a part of Arab 
Northern Africa (United Nations, 2011). 
2 Kasper, W. (2006b). “Make poverty history: tackle corruption,” The Center for Independent Studies, Vol. 67. 
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economies differ. It is commonly the situation that in cross-country growth regressions an Africa dummy is 
negative and significant. The region slow economic growth is therefore to certain extent explicable in terms of 
specific variables that are globally significant for the growth process but are low in the Africa continent (Collier 
and Gunning 1999: 65). If Africa is demonstrably dissimilar from other regions, it is legitimate to sample the 
region only. We as well employ a dissimilar measure of external finance that past surveys, excluding kinds of 
overseas assistance that are not likely to have any medium-term influence on growth (for example, technical 
assistance). In a study conducted by Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004), these authors employ the same 
measures of foreign aid to survey, as well as interpret these as capturing the short-term influence of overseas 
assistance on growth. These authors discover that foreign aid has a significant positive short-term influence; this 
effect is largely independent of policy and is present in Sub-Saharan Africa and developing economies generally. 
This report main focus is on the treatment of investment; how sensitive are the outcomes to the issue of 
investment in the aid-growth equation?  Most empirical growth surveys focused on reduced form specifications 
and aid-growth regressions typically omit investment. According to a report from Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
both authors argue that external finance contributes to investment while policy determines the productivity of 
investment and so involve an ‘aid×policy’ interaction term but they exclude investment. On a similar note, 
Roodman (2004) exclude investment in some of his regressions.  The study of Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
recognize that the implicit growth theory will have investment, not external finance, as an argument. They 
display some outcomes involving external finance as well as investment. Generally, development assistance is 
not significant in these regressions, but they do discover that external finance is a significant determining factor 
of investment. 
External finance is envisioned to influence growth through its effect on investment. But, not all 
development assistance is envisioned for investment, as well as not all investment is funded by foreign aid. 
Certainly, Dollar and Easterly (1999) argue that there is no evident correlation between investment and external 
finance in a sample of Sub-Saharan Africa economies, though both authors only report summary outcomes from 
a simple bivariate regression of gross investment on external finance (this paper complete specification 
recognizes the influence of external finance on investment, see Appendix B below).   
If the method of omitting investment is adopted, there will be a potential omitted variable bias – any 
influence of investment on growth is credited to the other variables (particularly aid). If investment and 
assistance are included, there is double counting (as some assistance is employed for investment), and the 
coefficient are biased. In order to address this problem, the technique of generated repressors was suggested. 
The basic debate of this study is that central variables in growth equation are directly, at least in part, 
funded by external finance and this inherent interrelationship should be addressed in the empirical examination. 
Despite the fact that one could estimate a set of simultaneous equations, there are also some challenges in 
relation to the data. So in this paper, we suggested a more parsimonious method; firstly, we test whether external 
finance is a direct determining factor of the variable in question (which was referred to as the transmission 
mechanism). Secondly, the removal of the directed impact of external finance by constructing a generated 
repressor for the variable was initiated. In this fashion, we can estimate the impact of foreign aid on growth 
accounting for the influence of external finance on mediating variables -- imports, government consumption 
spending and investment are the variables considered in this study. The basic objective is not to clarify the 
transmission mechanism but simply to determine if assistance is a significant factor; all these supplementary 
regressions are reported in the appendix below. 
This study is conducted for a sample of twenty-five Sub-Saharan Africa economies over the period of 
1970-1997 (the sample consist entirely of nations for which data on all variables was available for the complete 
period). The selected Sub-Saharan Africa nations in this paper tend to be major aid recipients. In spite of the 
large aid inflows, these countries experienced on average only 0.6 percent of growth in real per capita GDP per 
annum over the period of 1970 to 1979, and only six of the sample mention in this paper managed to ‘upgrade’ 
to the group of middle-income nations. Based on a priori expectation, this may seem to be the situation of aid 
ineffectiveness. If external finance has been generally misused and is not effective, we should discover proof of 
this in a sample consisting of Sub-Saharan Africa nations. 
Despite the fact that this paper main focus is on the treatment of investment and aid, it is obvious from 
the aid effectiveness literature that any effect of external finance on growth is indirect. The remaining part of this 
paper is organized as follows: part two deals with the literature review on the study of foreign aid and economic 
growth whereas section three looks at the countless factors that mediate the influence of aid on growth, what the 
paper refer to as transmission mechanisms. In addition to investment, external finance may influence growth 
through effects on imports or regime expenditure. The data that was employed as well as the econometric 
techniques are discussed in part four (with further details in Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey 2002). Appendix A 
offers information on the data, and Appendix B emphasis on the supplementary regressions for transmission 
mechanisms. Section five discussed the empirical analysis for aid effectiveness as well as the implications. Part 
five concludes the paper with some observations. 
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2 Literature Review  
The empirical study of the effectiveness of foreign aid, previously explored in the 1970s, received renewed 
attention in the early 1990s. As foreign aid encountered a crisis of legitimacy, the survey by Burnside and Dollar 
(1997) offered an answer to the detractors of foreign aid. The authors displayed that the effectiveness of 
development assistance is contingent on better governance in the recipient nations. In spite of the reservations 
promoted by numerous surveys (Easterly, 2003, Boone, 1994; Temple, 2010), Burnside and Dollar (1997) 
conclusions would be adopted and defended by the World Bank (1998), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Lensink 
and White (2000), with vital implications for economic policy.  
From this viewpoint, the central subject for the association between foreign aid and economic growth 
is whether the distribution of external finance to nations structurally characterized by weak governance can be 
considered wasteful. Gomanee et al. (2005) provide a tentative answer to this question by emphasizing on the 
direct and indirect effects of ODA on Sub-Saharan Africa economic growth. They utilize panel data for twenty-
five Sub-Saharan Africa nations from the period of 1970-1997. The findings of their regressions display that 
development assistance has a positive direct and indirect effects on economic growth. Indirectly, aggregate 
foreign aid affects economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa through public investments. The finding corroborates 
the results of Hansen and Tarp (2001). This optimistic vision is similarly shared by Tarp et al. (2003), who 
discovered that development assistance is effective even when macroeconomic conditions are poor. This 
assertion is as well in line with the survey by Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), which discovered that returns on 
assistance are higher in nations vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. 
However, Rajan and Subramanian (2008, 2001) did not share the same optimistic view as the other 
authors; they estimated a neoclassical production function to assess the effect of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) on growth over a period of thirty years. Both authors identify no significant effect of aid in a 
sample of developing nations including African nations. According to their 2010 article, they identified that 
augmented development assistance may lead to appreciation in the exchange rate, thereby producing a negative 
effect on growth. 
Recently, Tarp et al. (2011), in the same vein as Radelet et al. (2004), observed that numerous surveys 
employ panel data or cross-section data with a short time dimension, indicating only the cyclical effect of foreign 
aid. Furthermore, in order to offset this limitation, these authors conducted an investigation of a sample of thirty-
eight Sub-Saharan African nations over the period of 1960-2007.  Their study was distinguished by the 
methodological choice of the error correction model employed to capture the long-term dynamic of the 
correlation between foreign aid and economic growth. They concluded that external finance indirectly and 
directly foster economic growth even in an unfavorable macroeconomic context. Specifically, the observed 
effect is transmitted via investment in public capital. On a similar note, the study conducted by Hadjimichael et 
al. (1995), McGillivray and Ouattara (2003), Kene et al. (2008), Brempong and Asiedu (2008), Arndt et al. 
(2010) and Dietrich and Wright (2012) identified multiple channels via which development assistance is 
transmitted, notably education, taxes, investment, imports, government expenditure, a policy variable (that is a 
linear mixture of inflation, openness to trade, budget surplus) and institutions. 
In fact, most surveys addressing the indirect relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in 
Africa arrived at conflicting outcomes. Furthermore, while the microeconomic contexts of several surveys were 
recognized as a controlling factor for effectiveness, some surveys consider political environment, much less the 
heterogeneity of channels via which the effect of that environment is transmitted. In light of the foregoing, the 
contributions of numerous surveys were based on recognizing the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid on 
economic growth and determining the channels via which those effects happened. These studies continue the line 
of examination pursued Morrissey (2001), Gomanee et al. (2005) and de Tarp et al. (2011). Unlike those surveys, 
however, it carries out a comparative analysis between those in a stable setting and Sub-Saharan Africa nations 
in a post-conflict setting. In this regard, it employs the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method to clarify 
dissimilarities in economic growth. The aim of this survey is to display that Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), when controlled by governance, contributes directly or indirectly to clarifying economic growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa. It endeavors to display that Official Development Assistance (ODA) indirectly impacts 
economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa through investment in public capital (infrastructure) and in human 
capital (education). The channels of transmission differ according to the political setting in the recipient nations. 
Recently, Minoiu and Reddy (2010) empirical proof on the effectiveness of development assistance in 
sustaining economic growth and development’ however, remains mixed. Most surveys offered empirical 
evidence in favor of foreign aid effectiveness, at least in certain macroeconomic settings and under certain 
circumstances. In another study by Javid and Qayyum (2011), both authors surveyed the effectiveness of foreign 
aid, centering on the ongoing debate on interactive effect of development assistance and policy on sustainable 
economic growth. Their result shows that real GDP and foreign aid have negative correlation, while the aid-
policy interactive term and real GDP growth have a positive and significant correlation. In a recent study 
conducted by Fasanya and Onakoya (2012), both authors result displayed that foreign aid flows have significant 
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influence on economic growth, as upsurge in domestic investments has positive effect on economic growth on 
the recipient country. On the other hand, Clemens et al. (2012) conclude in their current assessment: “the aid-
growth literature does not presently possess a robust and patently valid instrumental variable with which to 
reliably test the hypothesis that external finance strictly causes growth.” 
Currently, Galiani et al (2014) developed on the identification of previous studies with a strategy in the 
vein of a regression discontinuity. The authors concentrated on thirty-five poor nations, some of which crossed 
an arbitrary per capita income threshold that made these nations ineligible for development assistance from the 
World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA). Under the interpretation that nations above the 
threshold are similar to those below the threshold except that those above receive less aid. They used whether a 
nation is above or below the threshold as instrument for development assistance; their result shows that aid 
upsurges economic growth. 
In fact, we can conclude on the review of the above literature on foreign aid effectiveness in 
developing nations that development assistance has stimulated economic growth on one hand and substituted for 
domestic savings on the other hand. These actions in a way have caused severe debt serving problems in 
developing nations. Accordingly, development assistance has a positive influence on economic growth in 
developing nations with good policies. On the other hand, in the presence of poor polices, foreign aid has no 
positive effect on economic growth. 
 
3 Transmission Mechanisms  
Even though there have been key developments in growth theory, the conceptual underpinning the relationship 
between external finance and growth remains entrenched (implicitly if not explicitly) in the two-gap model 
pioneered by Chenery and Strout (1966). The investigative framework is built on Harrod-Domar growth model 
where savings are required to finance the investment needed to achieve a target growth rate, subject to the 
productivity capital.  The Harrod-Domar growth model was strongly criticized by Easterly (1999) as a basis for a 
theory of growth, and specifically of their use by multilateral agencies to guide external finance allocation as 
filling funding gaps. However, the gap method is helpful in recognizing how external finance may influence 
growth by relaxing particular constraints. In a study by Bacha (1990), the author recognizes the following three 
constraints: the fiscal constraints on investment, the limit on investment because of low domestic savings and the 
limited capability to import investment goods if export earnings are low.  By means of relaxing these constraints 
external finance can influence growth through upsurge investment. 
Nations that are poor lack enough domestic resources to fund investment and the foreign exchange to 
import capital goods and technology. External finance to fund investment can directly fill the savings-investment 
gap and, as it is in the form of hard currency; external finance can indirectly fill the foreign exchange gap. As 
official aid is channeled to regime, it can as well finance regime expenditure and compensate for a small 
domestic tax base. In a survey conducted by Bacha (1990), the author demonstrates that regime fiscal response 
represents a significant channel via which external finance flows can influence growth. Current examinations as 
well highlight the potential significance of regime policy as a determining factor of the effects of external 
finance. 
 
Figure 1: A Stylized Possible Causal Diagram 
The above diagram illustrates schematically the likely relationship via which external finance, given 
corruption-control and democracy, which should ensure that external finance goes into savings and investment, 
could have a vital and positive influence on economic growth over time. The beginning is one key assumptions 
of Development Economic which states that because poor nations are poor they have no means to invest and 
therefore external finance is anticipated to bridge the gap relating to the lack of investment capacity of the 
recipient nations (Sachs, 2005). Therefore, if this is true, one assumes that overseas assistance to poor nations 
would indeed add in growing the availability of investment channeled to human and physical capital (Gomanee 
et al, 2005). But as display by the diagram, even though intuitively one would anticipate that external finance 
should be channeled into savings and investment, in practice this anticipation is not straight forward. Good and 
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sound governance, regime policies, generally, corruption-control and democracy, in our situation, constitute a 
sine qua non condition that guarantee the fact that external finance is directed into investment and savings. 
Through this procedure, those Sub-Saharan Africa nations with better policies, corruption-control, and those 
nations which are democratic with good economic management shall thus benefit directly from them. In an 
environment like this, there is the possibility that overseas assistance should result in augmented economic 
growth. In corrupt and undemocratic nations, however, external finance is embezzled by the regimes or the elites 
in power or involved in other unproductive activities and so external finance will be inefficient in such 
environment (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). 
A suitable framework to examine how external finance works should address all of these interactions. 
The investigation here centers on the influence of overseas assistance on economic growth taking into 
consideration the transmission mechanisms of investment, fiscal responses (regime expenditure) and trade 
(imports). If overseas assistance funds investment then, conditional on the productivity of investment (which 
may possible be connected to policy) external finance adds to economic growth. Low-income nations will 
require to import intermediate inputs and capital goods (and in most situation fuel), but export earnings are 
frequently volatile and low. External finance can fund essential imports, particularly investment goods; therefore, 
this is a potential transmission mechanism. If external finance is treated as fungible, so that finances envisioned 
for investment are diverted to recurrent expenditure, its effectiveness could be lessened. This is looked into by 
bearing in mind that regime consumption is a (constraining) transmission mechanism; however, this implies that 
the goal of external finance is to fund investment.  If development assistance is envisioned to fund expenditure 
on human capital formation and welfare, we would expect certain part to go to consumption expenditure and not 
influence economic growth, at least not in the short term.1 The simple technique is to identify if overseas 
assistance determines the transmission variables. If this technique works, this effect is accounted for estimating 
the aid-growth connection. 
The reason why we do not pursue the transmission mechanism through regime policy in this study is 
because, firstly, current study on external finance effectiveness incorporates policy indicators as control variables, 
and we do this rather than involve an aid policy term. Secondly, the conventional opinion, at least in the context 
of cross-country growth regressions, is that it is hard to establish that external finance affects policy (World 
Bank 1998; Burnside and Dollar 2000). In simple expressions, the nature of this transmission mechanism and 
how to model it is not well understood. We would thus anticipate this mechanism to be weak in cross-country 
regressions.2 Therefore, so as to base our focus particularly on transmission mechanisms, we account for policy 
indicators but do not exactly account for aid-policy interactions. 
One more matter we do not include is the tendency for Sub-Saharan Africa nations to be subject to 
economic and political instability. Compared with other regions, Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly susceptible 
to agricultural and climate risk as well as particularly vulnerable to terms of droughts, political conflict, trade 
shocks, famines and more currently, floods. According to Guillaumont, Guillaumont-Jeanney and Brun (1999) 
study, these authors discover that Sub-Saharan Africa has higher levels of primary instabilities (that is terms of 
trade, climate and political) than other developing-nation regions. This kind of vulnerability is a source of 
‘economic uncertainty’ that may possibly lessen growth rate and assist to clarify external finance ineffectiveness. 
On the other hand, Lensink and Morrissey (2000) employ aid instability, deviations of external finance from a 
trend involving adaptive anticipations, as a measure of uncertainty. The authors discover that when one controls 
for such uncertainty in the aid-growth regression, the coefficient on external finance is positive and significant 
while the coefficient on the external finance instability measure is negative and significant. The outcome holds 
for the sample of Sub-Saharan Africa nations. Furthermore, both authors as well discover that the principal 
(positive) influence of external finance is through its influence on investment, an outcome corroborated by 
Hansen and Tarp (2001). 
There is correlated proof for the significance of uncertainty or instability in Sub-Saharan Africa 
nations. In a study carried out by Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1999), they discover that political instability 
has a direct negative effect on growth and as well indirect effect through discouraging investment. Furthermore, 
Guillaumont, Guillaumont-Jeanney and Brun (1999) notice that primary instabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
lessen economic growth by distorting economic policy; the rate of investment is volatile, therefore the growth 
rate is lowered. As deliberated on in the next part of this paper, by incorporating policy indicators (notably 
                                                 
1 Observing that aid-financed consumption does not contribute to growth does not mean that the aid provides no benefits. 
Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2005) show that aid can improve welfare indicators, such as infant mortality, by financing 
consumption spending on social sectors (health, education and sanitation). 
2 The point is that the way in which aid affects policy is complex and will depend on specific, often immeasurable, features of 
the recipient (see Morrissey 2004). Furthermore, aid may affect some policies and not others, and may affect policies over 
varying time spans (often of five and more years). This is a complex research topic in its own right, beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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inflation), investment and political variable in our specification we expect to pick up some of these effects. We 
can as well attempt to account for these omitted variables effects in the estimation (by testing between random 
and fixed effects estimators and employing strong regressions). However, our specification might probably omit 
some factors that clarify the poor economic growth performance in Sub-Saharan Africa nations.     
This paper specific objective is to account for the transmission mechanism of external finance on 
economic growth through investment. Though our concentration is on a sample of Sub-Saharan nations, the 
study as well relate the outcomes to some contributions on the aid effectiveness (Burnside and Dollar 2000; 
Hansen and Tarp 2001; Roodman 2004). Consequently, the study selects a specification close to that employed 
in these surveys. This study is to evaluate the sensitivity of outcomes to alternative treatments of the aid-
investment relationship, the survey digress from those surveys in omitting the aid-policy interaction term. It is 
well identified that there are several variables that might be important in cross-country growth regressions, but 
degree of freedom considerations and idea constraints need choices to be made. The data employ in this study 
and the estimation methods are deliberated on in the next part. 
 
4 Data and estimation issues 
The estimation for this study is conducted in a panel of seven four-year periods over 1970 to 1997. The study 
dependent variable (GROWTH) is (period) growth of real per capita GDP (data definitions as well as sources are 
presented in Appendix A). Whereas GDPO is the growth rate of real GDP per capita in the preceding year; it is 
added to capture the initial nation specific effects.1 PRIC15 represent the percentage of population aged 15 or 
above who have completed their primary education. INV represent investment as a share of GDP and it is added 
as indicators of physical and human capital. Two measures of aid were use; both expressed as a percentage of 
GNP and were obtained from OECD (1999).2 Furthermore, GRANTS which represent the total of grant aid 
while TAID represent the total aid is new ODA exclusive of food aid (which does not directly influence 
growth),3 technical cooperation and emergency relief (which may possibly impact growth but with long time lag). 
Additionally, in rough terms, TAID corresponds to net grants and loans (the original source does not recognize 
net loans separately). The GRANTSQ and TAIDSQ represent the squared aid terms; they are included to account 
for diminishing returns, in proportion to most surveys of aid effectiveness that posit a non-linear correlation (for 
example, Lensink and White 2001). 
The study incorporates several indicators of economic and political policy features of the nations. In a 
study by Alesina et al., the authors construct a democracy index DEM taking values between 1 and 3 based on 
information on electoral systems.4 Notably, higher values indicate weaker political rights. Three policy variables 
are incorporated: INFL which h represent the inflation rate, GCON which represent government consumption as 
a share of GDP and MDGP which represent imports as a percentage of GDP and as an indicator of openness.5 
Furthermore, the latter two variables as well represent potential transmission mechanisms. The effect of external 
finance is not mediated by these variables; so, in the regressions, the complete three variables can be interpreted 
as policy indicators. 
The base specification in general terms is thus (suppressing nation and time subscripts, as well as 
designating the error term as U): 
g = βcʹc + βAA + βEʹe + βPʹp + U                                                                                                (1) 
Growth (g) is the dependent variable and the measure of foreign aid is designated by A. In this study, 
there are three vectors of other variables. The vector of conditioning variables (c) involves human capital, initial 
income and investment. Additionally, the political indicator (p) is democracy while the economic policy 
                                                 
1 Many studies, such as Burnside and Dollar (2000), use lnGDP0 rather than GDP0, essentially as the log specification is a 
test for convergence. As our sample is restricted to SSA and initial GDP is used to control for initial country conditions rather 
than to test for convergence, we use GDP0. The transformation GDP0 to lnGDP0 reduces the variance of the series. We did 
include lnGDP0 in the regressions and the results are similar although significance levels on all variables are reduced. 
2 Many studies, such as Burnside and Dollar (2000), use lnGDP0 rather than GDP0, essentially as the log specification is a 
test for convergence. As our sample is restricted to SSA and initial GDP is used to control for initial country conditions rather 
than to test for convergence, we use GDP0. The transformation GDP0 to lnGDP0 reduces the variance of the series. We did 
include lnGDP0 in the regressions and the results are similar although significance levels on all variables are reduced. 
3 As a referee observed, insofar as food aid is delivered as food that the government can sell, it provides revenue that may be 
used for investment. Nevertheless, we exclude food aid because (i) the donor value reported need not be a good indicator of 
the value to the recipient, and (ii) any disincentive effects on domestic producers would have an adverse impact. 
4 This takes the value 1 for democratic regimes (countries with free competitive general elections with more than one party 
running), 2 for mixed democratic and authoritarian features (countries with some form of elections but with severe limits in 
the competitiveness of such ballots) and 3 for authoritarian regimes (countries in which their leaders are not elected). 
5 This takes the value 1 for democratic regimes (countries with free competitive general elections with more than one party 
running), 2 for mixed democratic and authoritarian features (countries with some form of elections but with severe limits in 
the competitiveness of such ballots) and 3 for authoritarian regimes (countries in which their leaders are not elected). 
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indicators (e) are import/GDP ratio, inflation and government consumption. 
Endogeneity and country-specific effects are the two core matters that characterize any empirical 
survey based on panel data. The first issue narrates the problems which arise from the time series dimension 
whereas the second issue results from observing numerous nations together. This study considers each briefly 
before deliberating on the generated regressor method used in the study. 
One critical assumption of ordinary least square (OLS) is that there is zero relationship between any 
explanatory variables and error term. If this is violated, the former is endogenous and OLS estimates will not be 
consistent.  The standard instrumental variables (IV) solution in this study is to carry out a two-stage process 
whereby instruments are employed for the endogenous variable, and it is commonly the case that results 
employing the instrumental variables (IV) methods are sensitive to the choices of instruments. In this case, we 
employ the Hausman test to examine whether aid and investment terms are endogenous. This includes 
comparing the outcomes of the instrumental variables (IV) and ordinary least square (OLS) regressions 
(employing the Sargan test for the validity of instruments). The result shows that, the test strongly fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that error term and regressors are not correlated. So, in this study sample, we discover no 
proof of the necessity to employ instruments. Additionally, we test and reject the necessity to employ fixed 
effects of estimators (econometric details are in Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey 2002)1 .This paper results were 
reported by employing lagged aid, on the basis that external finance through investment will take time to have 
influence growth. 
Other problem often encountered during the estimation process have to do with outliers, values of the 
dependent variable that are unusual, particularly the values of the explanatory variables (response outliers), or 
sometimes unusual values of an explanatory variable (design outliers).  The addition or omission of outliers, 
particularly if the sample size is small, can substantially change the outcome of the regression analysis. If 
beneficial generalizations are to be drawn, it turn out to be vital to make sure that the outcomes mirror what is 
going on in the majority of the sample instead of being motivated by few outlying observations only. 
Numerous techniques have been employed to address the issue of outliers in the empirical literature. In 
certain circumstances, the regression model is re-estimated iteratively omitting one observation at a time with the 
objective of recognizing that which exerts an important impact on the set of estimates. In other circumstances, 
observations with high residuals are not included from the sample. Both processes can be seen as a part of a 
sensitivity analysis after the key outcomes have been achieved. It is as well a general thing to omit data points 
with extreme values of the explanatory variables. In this paper, an alternative techniques was selected – strong 
regression (Rousseeuw and Leroy 1987), detailed in Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2002). One advantage 
with the strong estimation process is that it reduces the impact of outlying observations on the estimated equation 
instead of completely omitting them from an already small sample of which they are part 
One other problematic issue in panel growth regressions is that one is observing a connection across 
nations, so there is potential heterogeneity.  Sub-Saharan Africa nations have similarity in respect to certain 
structural characteristics, connecting mostly to their stage of political and economic development as well as 
climatic situations. But, they include a heterogeneous group of nations in terms of population, resources 
endowments, size, institutional arrangements, and level of GDP. Whereas we attempt to control for various 
variables (and certain problems accounts for strong estimation); in this study, we cannot discount the possibility 
of country-specific effects as a result of omitted variables (though the test for fixed effects does not propose this 
to be problematic). 
Residual generated regressors  
It has turn out to be a common practice to estimate regression equation in which constructed variables appear. 
One of the most popular techniques to generate regressors is to employ predicted residuals or value from a 
supplementary regression (indeed, instrument variable is one good example of the former), Based on the 
prevalence models like that, Pagan (1984) offers ‘a justly complete treatment’ of the econometric matters 
underlying regressions with generated variables. Based on the fact that this is the technique the paper employ to 
include transmission mechanism, a brief dialogue is in order. Officially, the technique is a special situation of the 
subsequent overall model (in matrix form). 
Y= µX ⃰ + γ(X−X ⃰) + U                                                                                                                      (2a) 
X = X ⃰ + η = ωZ + η                                                                                                                          (2b) 
From equation 2a, the expression (X-X*) signifies that part of X which is clarify by the factors other 
than Z. Furthermore, equation 2b estimates the correlation between Z and X such that ω provides a measure of 
the strength of the relationship that exists between them. According to Pagan (1984), the author displays that the 
                                                 
1 A popular solution to the problem of fixed effects is to remove the effects by first differencing and then use an instrumental 
variable technique such as GMM. However, first differencing reduces the sample size and reduces the variation and co-
variation in the data (Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey 2002). One reason why fixed effects may not be so important is that 
our sample comprises SSA countries only (and we use robust regression to account for outliers). 
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two step process of estimating (2b) and employing the outcomes in (2a), provides asymptotically well-organized 
estimates and the right values for the standard errors. In this paper, we construct the generated regressor 
employing only the residuals from a supplementary equation. This indicates that ordinary least square (OLS) 
provides us the right estimates of variance and efficient coefficient estimates. Meaning, this conclusion is 
independent of whether equation 2a involves extra regressor or the latter seems to be in the matrix Z – in our 
situation, aid seems to be in equation 2b. So, the purpose of employing residuals does not invalidate the 
inferences made and coefficient estimates are efficient. 
In this study, we construct the variable signifying that portion of investment that is not attributed to 
external finance (INVRES) by employing residual from an aid-investment bivariate regression (capturing the 
transmission from external finance to investment).Furthermore, (INVRES) is the estimate of Қ1 from the 
regression INV = Қ1+ Қ2 AID. We then substitute INVRES for INV in the growth regression. In this study, it is 
worth noticing that this transformation affects only the estimated coefficient on the external finance variables. 
This fact can be demonstrated in overall terms. Supposing we have an initial regression that looks like this: 
g = β1X + β2A + βzʹz + U                                                                                                                                (3a) 
where z is the vector of other variables, substituting X=Қ1 + Қ2 A: 
g = β1 (X− Қ2 A) + β1(Қ2 A) + β2A + βzʹz + U                                                                                               (3b) 
or 
g = β1 Қ1  + (β1 Қ2  + β2 A + β zʹz + U                                                                                                         (3c) 
Therefore, it is obvious that only the coefficient on the external finance variable is changed. In 
situation where the ‘transmission’ variable (X) has a positive influence on growth and external finance has a 
positive influence on the variable, this technique will offer for a larger coefficient of external finance. On the 
other hand, if the variable has a negative influence on growth and external finance is a positive determining 
factor of the variable, the coefficient on external finance is lessened. If it transpires that external finance is not 
the determining factor of the variable, there is no effect and the techniques is not employed. 
 
5 Results and discussion 
Based on the above discussion, three potential transmission variables are involved (INV, GCON and MGDP). 
Initially, we test if these are really transmission mechanisms for the effect of external finance and the outcomes 
are reported in Appendix B. The initial step is simply to determine if the coefficient on the external finance is 
important in a multivariate regression of impacts on the specific transmission variable. It emerges that external 
finance is only an important determining factor of investment and imports among these variables, but only 
investment is an important determining factor of economic growth. Though external finance is not found to be an 
important determining factor of regime consumption expenditure in the sample (likely whys and wherefores are 
deliberated in Appendix B), we as well involve outcomes below with a generated regressor for GCONS.  
Our basic specification is: 
GROWTHit =δ0 + δ1 GDP0t,t-1 + δ2 PRIC15it + δ3 + INVit + δ4 DEMit + δ5 INFLit + δ6 GCONit  
                                  + δ7 MGDPit + δ8 AIDit + δ8 AIDSQit + uit 
For ease of comparison with past surveys, which take on a specification that has similarity with (4) 
without investment, and based on the fact that the treatment of investment plays a significant role in this paper 
analysis, we start by presenting outcomes from estimating (3) with INV not included. Table 1 shows the 
outcomes of this general reduced form of regression. The entire control variables except MGDP and GCON are 
significant and of the anticipated sign. Inflation has a negative correlation with growth while education has a 
positive correlation. Democracy has a positive correlation with growth (we can recall that higher values indicate 
less democratic governments) as its initial GDP (that is to say, nations with more favourable initial conditions 
have a tendency to perform better). Notably, the coefficients on both external finance measures are positive and 
significant, whether recent or lagged values are employed. These outcomes are compare with our other estimates 
below. 
Based on the fact that investment is omitted from the reduced form in Table 1, a usual inference would 
be that the coefficient on external finance is capturing the investment outcome. However, it is possible, that 
when investment is omitted it will influence certain coefficient estimates for other variables. To the degree that 
variables capturing the policy surroundings impact the productivity of investment, this is a separate possibility. 
Furthermore, the study explores this by including directly the effect of external finance via funding investment 
by generating a distinct variable for investment not funded by external finance directly.  
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Robust aid-growth regressions excluding investment 











































































Observations 149 149 134 134 
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.37 
Notes: Time dummies included in all regressions. Absolute t-statistics reported as a weighting system is used for 
the robust regression. Significance levels indicated as ***, ** and * for 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Robust aid-growth regressions with INVRES 






































































































Observations 149 149 135 135 
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.43 
Notes: See Table 1. 
In appendix B, the ‘transmission regression’ display that external finance is an important factor in 
clarifying variations in imports and investment. In this study, the import variable is on no occasion important in 
the growth regressions; investment is the mechanism the study address. 
From this study, Table 2 display the estimation outcomes of the growth model as stated by equation (3) 
with the generated regressor INVRES.1 The entire control variables are important, apart from MGDP, and have 
the anticipated sign (for instance, if GDPO were to pick up convergence, the sign should be negative but here it 
is controlling for initial conditions). In contrast to Table 1, the coefficient on regime expenditure is presently 
found to be significant and negative. Both measures of external finance have positive as well as significant 
coefficients that are remarkably alike, 0.3 on the recent value (average over the period) and 0.5 on the lagged 
value (past period average), proposing that loans and grants have nearly the same influence on growth (on 
average). So, this negatively signed aid squared terms are consistent with the proposition of an external finance 
Laffer curve (Lensink and White 2001), or more commonly diminishing returns to external finance. 
According to the specification, the coefficient estimates for aid variables do differ. In the entire 
specification, the lagged effect of aid on growth is greater than the recent effect. When investment is not 
                                                 
1 INVRES is estimated from (t-ratios in parentheses): 
INV = 1.33 GRANTS    R2 = 0.41;    INV = 1.58 GRANTS_1  R2  = 0.46 
          (12.78)                                                (13.20) 
INV =    1.30 TAID    R2 = 0.39;       INV = 1.51 TAID_1    R2  = 0.42 
              (12.17)                                             (12.16) 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.17, 2015 
 
117 
included (Table 1), the coefficient on recent aid of 0.2 is lower than when INVRES is employed, but the 
coefficient of 0.5 on lagged aid is higher. When INV is incorporated (distinct outcomes in Table 2), the 
coefficient on recent aid is only weakly significant while that on lagged aid is significant but, at 0.25, lower than 
in other estimates. This give backing to this study hypothesis that aid coefficient in a regression involving 
investment term will undervalue (underestimate) the right influence of aid on growth. 
Bearing in mind only the estimates on lagged aid, as influences of external finance on growth should 
happen over time, we discover proof of a significant positive influence of external finance in the entire 
specifications. In this study, we find that the treatment of investment does not change the result of significance, 
but it does influence the value of the estimated coefficient, ranging from about 0.25 to 0.5. It is reassuring for our 
method that not including investment entirely provides the highest estimate (the entire investment effect may 
possibly be credited to external finance) while incorporating INV with external finance yields the lowest 
estimate (by way of under-valuing the influence of external finance through investment). Based on this, by 
employing the generated regressor may provide a ‘better’ estimate. 
Though we discover no proof that external finance clarifies variations in regime expenditure 
(Appendix B), we do discover that spending like that has a negative influence on growth but only when 
investment is not included as well. As a strong check, in Table 3 we permit for the fact that certain aid does 
directly fund expenditure and construct a generated regressor GCONRES. As would be anticipated, this lessens 
the estimated coefficient on the aid variables (but again the outcomes are not sensitive to the measure of external 
finance employed). Certainly, the coefficient on current external finance is no longer significant; an outcome 
consistent with Burnside and Dollar (2000), nevertheless that the lagged aid is significant with a coefficient of 
0.23. One fact that need to be given emphasis to is that while external finance earmarked to consumption 
expenditure may not have an influence on growth does not essentially mean that such aid does not benefit the 
recipient (financing education or health may well contribute to human development).1 
This study outcomes display that aid is related with higher growth in Sub-Saharan Africa economies.  
This statement applies once diminishing returns are accounted for, as the only two nations in the sample received 
external finance beyond the threshold level.2  Based on the point estimates obtained in the past part of this study, 
Table 4 reports the marginal external finance effects by bringing together the entire estimates of the derivative of 
growth with regard to external finance. 
When evaluated at mean external finance level, we again discover that once the indirect influences via 
investment are incorporated, the influence of external finance on growth is positive and significant. We identify 
the fact that these influences are observed on average. In spite of the focus on a sample restricted to Sub-Saharan 
Africa nations only, it is sensible to be certain of the fact that estimates on average mask both within and across-
country variance in external finance effects. Based on practical purpose, one fact that is more appealing is the 
degree to which this study estimates are beneficial in offering information on distinct economies experiences. 
                                                 
1  For evidence that aid-financed current spending may be beneficial see Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2005) and 
Gomanee et al. (2005). 
2 Based on Regression 1 and 2 from Table 5, GRANTS and TAID would have to surpass 51 per cent and 40 per cent for 
diminishing returns to set in. Only Rwanda (in 1994-97) and Gambia (in 1986-89) received aid in excess of this optimal level. 
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Robust aid-growth regressions with INVRES and GCONRES 



















































































Observations 149 149 135 135 
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.43 
Notes: As for Table 1. GCONRES is estimated from (t-stats in parentheses): 
           GCON = 1.13 GRANTS (16.26) R2 = 0.54; GCON = 1.29 GRANTS _1 (15.72)   R2 = 0.56  
           GCON = 1.11 TAID (15.60)   R2 = 0.52;    GCON = 1.25 TAID_1    (14.58) R2 = 0.52     
 
Table 4 
Marginal effect of aid on growth 
 At GRANTS = 8.16 At TAID = 7.96 









Note: t-ratios in parentheses 
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Regressions with GRANTS 
Country Time period Unexplained 
growth 
GRANTS Growth Contribution of 
aid (δ8 AID-δ9 
AID
2 
10 lowest absolute values of unexplained GROWTH 
South Africa 1994-1997 0.07 0.29 1.20 0.09 
Gambia 1978-1981 0.10 15.71 0.60 4.07 
Zimbabwe 1990-1993 0.12 6.75 -1.47 1.93 
Congo Dem. 1990-1993 0.13 4.41 -12.62 1.29 
Zimbabwe 1994-1997 0.13 5.26 1.98 1.53 
Senegal 1982-1985 0.14 7.97 1.43 2.25 
Congo Dem. 1970-1973 0.16 2.47 0.75 0.74 
Mauritius 1994-1997 0.17 0.97 3.62 0.29 
Togo 1974-1977 0.19 6.00 0.44 1.73 
Togo 1970-1973 0.25 6.56 0.53 1.88 
10 highest absolute values of unexplained GROWTH 
Botswana 1970-1973 10.99 9.82 18.51 2.72 
Togo 1994-1997 6.81 9.19 6.29 2.56 
Cameroon 1986-1989 6.38 1.90 -3.99 0.57 
Sierra Leone 1994- 1997 6.23 12.20 -7.78 3.29 
Niger 1970-1973 6.01 5.69 -5.78 1.64 
Congo Rep 1994 -1997 5.87 13.66 -2.07 3.62 
Senegal 1978-1981 5.84 7.25 -3.14 2.06 
Swaziland 1986-1989 5.77 6.61 7.29 1.89 
Cameroon 1990-1993 5.62 3.28 -6.69 0.97 
Mauritius 1978-1981 5.52 2.05 -0.73 0.61 
Note: Residuals are from Regression 1 of Table 2. 
Bearing this in mind, we calculate the expected contribution of external finance to growth, δ8AID-
δ9AID
2, where GRANTS and TAID are the significant external finance definitions (Table 5a and 5b, respectively). 
Clearly, as we are employing the estimated coefficient from the panel regressions, external finance is anticipated 
to have a positive influence on growth (as well as the magnitude will rely on the amount of aid received). In this 
study we cannot estimate the real influence of aid for each nation. However, we can liken cases where the 
regression performed well (ranging from the lowest residuals to the top panel in each table) with those where it 
performed poorly (the lower panel in each table). So, the presumption would be that the results of external 
finance efficacy is more reliable in the former, while omitted variables played a more significant role in the latter 
circumstances (thus that the ‘anticipated’ growth was not attained). 
From the above panel of every single table, ten observations are listed for which unexplained growth is 
lowest in absolute term. The study selected set of explanatory variables clarifies reasonably well the growth 
experience of those nations in that specific period. From the bottom panel of every table, the ten observations 
with the largest residual (unexplained growth) are listed. These listed nations are the ones that mostly 
experienced negative growth.  
Let’s deliberate on the two panels in Table 5a. Notably, the upper panel signifies growth (not including 
Congo) is 1 percent while external finance is estimated to contribute 1.6 percent to growth as a simple mean. On 
the part of the bottom panel, signify that growth (not including Botswana) is -1.8 percent while the mean 
contribution of external finance to growth is 1.9 percent. The anticipated input of external finance to growth is 
not very dissimilar in both panels, but growth performance is dramatically dissimilar. Based on this, we can 
interpret this by saying that aid was really not effective in the bottom panel group of nations (by assuming that 
the result would have been no worse in the absence of external finance). Furthermore, another interpretation is 
that other factors undermined the efficacy of development assistance in the poor performing nations. One factor 
responsible for this might be exogenous shocks; in a study by Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) and Lensink and 
Morrissey (2000), these authors display that external shocks and external finance instability are growth-lessening 
though external finance remains a positive factor. This study analysis cannot recognize these (growth-retarding) 
factors, but it can propose nations (and periods) that may deserve more study. However, such a case study 
complement is further than the scope of this paper. 
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Regressions with TAID 
Country Time period Unexplained 
growth 
GRANTS Growth Contribution of aid 
(δ8 AID-δ9 AID
2 
10 lowest absolute values of unexplained GROWTH 
Senegal 1982-1985 0.01 8.36 1.43 2.39 
Zimbabwe 1994-1997 0.02 5.02 1.98 1.50 
South Africa 1994-1993 0.03 0.14 1.20 0.05 
Togo 1970-1973 0.10 3.44 0.53 1.05 
Congo Dem 1990-1993 0.12 4.42 -12.62 1.33 
Lesotho 1978-1981 0.13 9.05 2.22 2.56 
Togo 1974-1977 0.14 4.88 0.44 1.46 
Mauritius 1994-1997 0.17 0.02 3.62 0.01 
Congo Dem. 1970-1973 0.19 1.36 0.75 0.43 
Mali 1982-1985 0.26 18.70 -0.89 4.57 
10 highest absolute values of unexplained GROWTH 
Botswana 1970-1973 10.00 16.47 18.51 4.17 
Sierra Leone 1994-1997 6.74 20.90 -7.78 4.92 
Togo 1994-1997 6.67 10.10 6.29 2.81 
Swaziland 1986- 1989 6.44 2.29 7.29 0.71 
Cameroon 1986-1989 6.31 1.73 -3.99 0.54 
Niger 1970 -1973 6.14 4.87 -5.78 1.46 
Congo Rep. 1994-1997 6.12 15.09 -2.07 3.90 
Senegal 1978-1981 5.96 7.56 -3.14 2.18 
Cameroon 1990-1993 5.82 4.09 -6.69 1.24 
Rwanda 1978-1981 5.60 8.46  5.35 2.41 
Note: Residuals are from regression 2 of Table 2. 
 
6 Conclusion   
External Finance effectiveness is a very critical and unsettled matter at the empirical and theoretical level. For 
that reason, our concern has been to address the question of aid effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa. Empirical 
surveys of the influence of external finance on growth fail to identify explicitly in the regression specification 
that external finance does not have direct effect; it operates through transmission mechanisms, such as regime 
expenditure and investment. One significant contribution of this paper is its input to the existing empirical 
literature on the effects of overseas assistance on the economic growth of developing economies by throwing 
some light on this aspect that need more research.  
In most aid regression, investment which is the most significant transmission mechanism is frequently 
omitted. For that reason, estimated aid coefficients in typical growth regressions may suffer from omitted 
variable bias. However, simply incorporating an investment term in the regression would lead to identification 
difficulties as certain external finance funds investment. In addressing this problem in this paper, we employ the 
method of generated regressors. This allows us to recognize that part of the effect on growth of the relevant 
transmission mechanism that is not owing to external finance, with the purpose of avoiding the omitted variable 
and double counting problems pertaining to investment. On a similar note, we recognize and account for the part 
of external finance that directly funds regime consumption expenditure, as well as which may not contribute to 
growth. 
In this study, we apply the technique to investigate the correlation between external finance and 
growth employing a panel of twenty-five Sub-Saharan Africa nations over the period of 1970 to 1997. In spite of 
the large aid inflows, Sub-Saharan Africa nations on average experienced merely 0.6 percent growth in real per 
capita GDP per annum over the period. Actually, this may seem to be the situation of aid ineffectiveness. Our 
econometric outcomes, which are strong regarding outliers and endogeneity, display that external finance has 
had positive influence on growth, largely via aid funded investment. Additionally, on average (by employing the 
marginal effect estimates), a one percentage point upsurge in the aid/GNP ratio adds one-quarter of one 
percentage point to the growth rate. Based on the fact that diverse measures and specification were employ to 
other surveys, our estimates are not directly comparable. However, the extensive result that external finance has 
positive and significant influence on growth is in line with Lensink and Morrissey (2000) and Clemens, Radelet 
and Bhavnani (2004), two other surveys that recognize Sub-Saharan Africa sample. 
In this study, inflation is included as a (macroeconomic) policy control, as have the anticipated 
negative sign. In addition, government consumption expenditure as well has a negative correlation with growth. 
More democratic governments seem to have higher growth performance. The variables with positive influence 
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on growth are initial GDP, education, aid and investment (that is to say, divergence in the sample as nations with 
higher incomes at the beginning of the period have a tendency to have higher subsequent growth rates). The 
outcomes, in demonstrating the advantages of external finance, education and investment and identifying the 
effects of macroeconomic policy and governance, give backing to the arguments of the Commission for Africa 
(2005). 
One limitation of cross-country panel regressions is that one estimates the average value of a 
coefficient, and this is not an estimate valid for any specific nation. However, what one is looking for is 
empirical regularities or patterns. In this case, we recognize a tendency for external finance to contribute to 
growth via investment; however, this does not indicate that external finance ensures growth. Certainly, several 
Sub-Saharan Africa nations have had a very poor growth performance; this is the reason why Sub-Saharan 
Africa nations continue to be large recipients of external finance. In most cases, this is to a certain extent as a 
result of bad policy, but that is not the complete clarification and our outcomes propose that external finance can 
be effective even if policies are bad (this study incorporates variables to capture policy). The variables in this 
paper was able to reveal that the aid-growth model capture sources of positive growth better than clarifying the 
forces behind negative growth performance. On a different note, the negative growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
nations seems to be as a result of factors other than those represented in this study regression. This gives backing 
to the fact that the observed combination of generous aid flows and slow growth in Sub-Saharan Africa does not 
essentially indicate external finance ineffectiveness.  
One cannot take no notice of the possibility that had Sub-Saharan Africa nations not received aid, the 
region might have experienced even slower, or in certain situation more severe negative, growth. The 
effectiveness of external finance lower than could otherwise be possible in the absence of shocks (or other 
omitted variables) would appear to be a more plausible clarification. With that been said, this is not to claim that 
external finance channel to Africa has been a success – clearly it has not, as observed growth performance has 
not matched aid receipts. However, there is more than a pedantic difference between claiming that this indicates 
external finance is not effective and claiming that external finance has been effective though its potential 
contribution to growth has not been completely actualized. So, while recognizing and addressing the factors that 
clarify Africa poor growth performance, the latter lay emphasis on, implicitly at last, the desirability of 
maintaining external finance. The region poor growth record should not thus be attributed to external finance 
ineffectiveness. This study conclusion is that external finance has been useful to nations in Africa, but more 
needs to be done to make sure that these benefits lead to sustained economic growth. 
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Appendix A: Definitions and Sources of Data 
GROWTH = Growth of real GDP per capita 
GDPO = Real GDP per capita (in the year preceding the period) 
PRIC15 = Population aged 15 or above having completed primary education (per cent), at beginning of each 
period. Source: Barro and Lee Data Set, Updated April 2000 (Harvard CID, downloaded from 
www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/) 
INV = Gross domestic investment (per cent of GDP) 
DEM = Democracy index, in 1970 and 1982; values between 1 and 3 with lower values being more democratic. 
Source: Alesina et al. (1992) 
INFL = Inflation rate 
GCON = Government consumption (per cent of GDP) 
MGDP = imports (per cent of GDP) 
XGDP = Exports (per cent of GDP) 
TOT = Terms of trade 
RER = Real exchange rate, calculated from the nominal exchange rate figures 
BMP = Black market premium. Source: downloaded from the Global Development Network Growth Database, 
accessed October 2000 (no longer on the World Bank web site) 
CFA = Dummy takes value of 1 for CFA franc zone member countries and 0 otherwise 
CRED = Credit available to private sector (per cent of total domestic credit) 
GASTILS = Gastils Political Rights index. Source: Freedom House (downloaded March 2001, 
www.freedomhouse.org/) 
GRANTS = ODA grants (per cent of GNP). Source: OECD (1999) 
TAID = Total net ODA less technical cooperation, food aid and emergency relief (per cent of GNP). Source: 
OECD (1999) 
TRGDP = Total tax revenue (per cent of GDP) 
EXTDEBT = External debt (per cent of GDP) 
STATE = Dummy takes value of 1 for legitimate countries and 0 otherwise. Source: Englebert (2000)  
Unless otherwise specified, the source for the entire variables in this paper is gotten from World Bank Africa 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.17, 2015 
 
123 
Database (2000). The entire variables refer to period averages 1970-73, 1974-77, 1978-81, 1982-85, 1986-89, 
1990-93 and 1994-97 apart from GDPO and the time invariant regressors. 
Table A1: Twenty-five countries in the sample for regressions 
     Benin Botswana Cameroon 
     Central Africa Congo Republic Congo Democratic Republic 
     Gambia Ghana Kenya 
     Lesotho Madagascar Malawi 
     Mali Mauritius Niger 
     Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone 
     South Africa Swaziland Tanzania 
     Togo Uganda Zambia 
     Uganda   
        
Table A2 
Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std dev. Min Max Std dev. First 
difference 
GROWTH 34 0.660 3.750 -12.618 18.510 4.572 
GDPO 34 1242.382 1096.644 247 6409.000 330.913 
INV 34 19.547 10.518 3.268 84.551 6.662 
PRIC15 25 7.257 3.710 1 19.900 1.560 
DEM 32 2.656 0.644 1 3 0 
GRANTS 34 8.161 6.992 0.044 57.317 5.158 
TAID 34 7.960 7.188 -0.009 50.712 5.286 
INFL 34 50.631 428.068 -3.574 6287.344 325.801 
GCON 34 15.461 5.749 5.859 43.938 3.855 
MGDP 34 38.317 22.411 8.333 142.697 7.984 
Note: Summary statistics reported for the variables in levels, unless stated otherwise. 
 
Appendix B: Transmission mechanisms  
Notably, the goal is simply to determine if the coefficient on the aid variable is significant in a multivariate 
regression based on the impact on the specific transmission variable. Though we are not attempting to ‘clarify’ 
the transmission variables, we try to find a parsimonious specification that mirrors the pertinent literature. It is 
significant to lay emphasis on the fact that we are not actually concerned with estimating the behavioral 
correlation, but rather with a funding association. However, we want to know if the external finance is an 
important determining factor of cross-country variations in the level of the transmission variables under 
consideration. 
 
B1 Determinants of investment 
In this study, we used total investment as the explanatory variable, in large part public (which is typically aid 
funded) but incorporating private (which in a behavioural association, will be influenced by external finance and 
public investment). Most of the literatures centers on private investment (for example, Greene and Villanueva 
1991; Dollar and Easterly 1999), and the fact is that is not directly relevant. So, our specification is envisioned to 
involve major factors affecting both public and private investment. This will assist to account for the dependence 
of the recent investment levels on physical and human capital stock, and one lagged investment and a measure of 
human capital were included (PRIC15). Furthermore, the real interest rate data was not included because we did 
not have data on it, and the use of two policy variables to capture this impact was utilized; in addition to this, the 
inflation rate (INFL) as well as the logarithm of credit obtainable to the private sector, measures in relation to the 
overall domestic credit (LNCRED). The Gastils index of rights is the political indicator used (GASTILS); the 
values that it take ranges between 1 and 7, where the higher values is an indication of less freedom. So to see if 
they are significant two measures of external finance are tested. 
INVit = β0 + β1INVi,t-1 + β2 PRIC15it + β3 INFLit + β4 GASTILSit + β5LNCREDit + β6 AIDit + β7 AIDSQit + εit                                                                                                                              
(B1) 
On the part of Table B1 we present the set of estimates that generate the coefficient estimates with the 
anticipated signs. The study obtains proof of a highly significant positive effect of external finance on investment. 
Looking at the signs, on average, and upsurge in GRANTS and TAID by one percent, increases the investment 
share in GDP by around 0.33 and 0.53 percent respectively. As anticipated, TAID is more significant both in 
terms of importance and magnitude. The findings propose that investment is an important transmission 
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mechanism and so it is essential to think through the ‘double-counting’ problem. 
The finding is not in line with Dollar and Easterly (1999), who discover no proof that external finance 
was a significant determining factor of investment. However, both authors merely report summary outcomes of a 
sample bivariate ordinary least square (OLS) regression for individual nation. 
Table B1 
Pooled OLS investment regressions 



























TAID  0.528 
(3.04)*** 






Observations 126 126 
R-squared 0.65 0.66 
F-Stat 27.17 22.91 
Prob> F-Stat 0.00 0.00 
Notes: All regressions run in a panel of seven four-year periods over 1970-97. Time dummies included in all 
regressions. Absolute t-values based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in 
brackets. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level. F-Stat tests the joint significance of all coefficients. 
 
B2 Financing imports  
Despite the fact that the literature on trade and growth tend to center on trade volume or export (that is the export 
plus import as a measure of openness), there are reasons why imports may possibly contribute to economic 
growth. In a study conducted by Thirlwall (2003), the author debates that a major advantage of exports is that 
they generate the foreign exchange needed to purchase the import need for economic growth. Clearly on our 
context is imported investment goods; the possibility is that imports may possibly proxy technology transfer. 
However, the concern we are having is to clarify the level of imports in terms of how they are funded. So we 
decided to employ MGDP as the dependent variable. In addition, we introduced export and the two measure of 
external finance as sources of overseas exchange needed to pay for imports; so that the purchasing power of 
these revenues will hinge on the exchange rate. The study incorporate numerous measures to capture such 
influences: black market premium (BMP), terms of trade (TOT), real exchange rate (ER) and a dummy (CFA) 
that takes a value of one for nations which are members of CFA franc zone. 
The import regression is stated as: 
MGDPit = η0 + η1XGDPit + η2AIDit + η3TOTit + η4RERit + η5 BMPit + η6 CFAit + eit                           (B2) 
Generally, the performance of the regression was good (Table B2). The chosen specification clarifies 
at least 31 percent in relation to the variation present in the dependent variable. External finance flows appear to 
be an important source of fund for imports (as would be anticipated). From the study, we find out that, on 
average, a one percent point upsurge in GRANTS upsurges imports/GDP by 0.9 percent, while each additional 
percent of TAID create an addition of 0.7 percent to the share of imports in GDP. Looking at these estimates, it 
would seem that imports are a potential transmission mechanism. For the fact that the coefficients on aid and 
exports which we see as the sources of foreign exchange in this study sum to more than unity is not itself an 
issue. Several nations uphold large (aid-funded) trade deficits, as well as other variables having a tendency to 
lessen imports (or, lessen the purchasing power of export and external finance revenue). Relating to our situation, 
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imports are not discovered to be the determining factors of economic growth, the transmission effect does not 
essentially have to be included. 
Table B2 
Pooled OLS imports regressions 
 IMPORT IMPORT 
XGDP 0.614 
     (5.51)*** 
0.610 
     (5.50)*** 
GRANTS 0.921 
      (3.24)*** 
 
TAID  0.713 
      (3.42)*** 
TOT -0.045 
     (2.04)** 
-0.049 
        (2.14)*** 
RER -0.003 
   (1.96)* 
-0.004 






    (1.80)* 
-6.187 
   (1.75)* 
Constant 22.095 
     (3.16)*** 
25.115 
      (3.24) *** 
Observations 131 131 
R-squared 0.33 0.31 
F-Stat     Prob> F-Stat 13.36 14.01 
 0.00 0.00 
Notes: As for Table B1. 
 
B3 Determinants of government consumption 
Numerous literatures show how external finance impact regime fiscal behavior, addressing either fiscal response 
model or fungibility (McGillivray and Morrissey 2004 gave a comprehensive review on this issue).  In this study, 
based on requirement, we abstract from the difficulties of these models and adopt a simple framework. Regime 
consumption expenditure, by definition, is certain proportion of revenue. Both overseas and domestic sources of 
regime revenue were consider – foreign aid flows (AID), total tax revenue as a share of GDP (TRGDP), external 
debt as a share of GDP (EXTDEBT) and inflation (INFL) representing seigniorage. Recognizing the fact that 
features of the existing political institution may possibly impact the earmark of regime resources; in this case we 
introduce the variable STATE (Englebert 2000) as more suitable for our purposes than Gastils or DEM 
employed formerly. So in this case, this takes the value of 1 (or else 0) for legitimate nations which are believed 
to have more well-organized regimes. Based on the assumption that more well-organized or legitimate 
governments will be more probable to spend on investment, the hypothesized coefficient is negative. So based 
on this, we estimate the subsequent equation:  
GCONit = λ0 + λ1TRGDPit + λ2 INFLit + λ3 EXTDEBTit + λ4 AIDit + λ5 STATEi + uit                            (B3) 
The result is presented in Table B3. Generally, the regressions perform sensibly well. They clarify approximately 
fifty percent of the variation in regime consumption and the entire variables enter with the anticipated signs; but, 
the coefficient on aid is not significant. External finance does not appear to clarify cross-country variation in 
GCONS in this study sample. In its place, seigniorage and tax revenue clarify the variations in recurrent 
expenditure. Consequently, regime consumption does not seem to be a transmission mechanism, that is to say, 
the coefficient on GCON in aid growth regressions may possibly not involve any substantial indirect influence of 
external finance. This outcome may possibly appear surprising (though it is not inconsistent with the proof from 
fiscal response models), for that reason, in this study we permit for a (negative) transmission influence.  
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Government consumption regressions 
 GCON GCON 
TRGDP 0.524 
     (8.97)*** 
0.516 
    (8.89)*** 
INFL 0.003 
      (4.47) *** 
0.003 















      (3.12)*** 
5.187 
     (3.48)*** 
Observation 138 138 
R-squared 0.51 0.50 
F-Stat 10.89 11.51 
Prob> F-Stat 0.00 0.00 
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